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moral retribution. Such a self-critical attitude on the part of courts,
lawyers, and legislators will -benefit the entire legal complex as well as
society. In the words of Cardozo:
Jurisprudence will be the gainer in the long run by fanning the fires of
mental insurrection instead of smothering them with platitudes.47
EDwARD C. KAMINSKI
Shoplifting- Ohio Combats the Light.Fingered
Customer
The tiny, gray-haired grandmother was arrested when a clerk in a
super market caught her trying to smuggle out two cartons of cigarettes
and a canned ham.1 This incident, taken from the pages of a metropoli-
tan daily newspaper, is indicative of the problem potentially facing a
merchant each day that he opens his doors for business - the problem
of shoplifting. Merchants have been reluctant to apprehend and prose-
cute shoplifters for two reasons: fear of adverse publicity and consequent
loss of customer goodwill; and the ever-present danger of law suits for
false arrest and related torts.
This note will discuss the background of the tort problem and show
how Ohio has attempted to remedy it by statute.
NATuRE OF THE OFFENSE
Shoplifting may be defined as the theft of goods offered for sale by
a store or other mercantile establishment.2 A form of larceny, it is pun-
ishable in Ohio under the general larceny statute,3 which makes it a
felony, "grand larceny," if the value of the thing stolen is $60 or more,
and a misdemeanor, "petty larceny," if the value is less than $60.
The annual national total of goods stolen by shoplifters has been esti-
mated as high as 250 million dollars,4 and on this basis the Ohio loss is
approximately fourteen million dollars.5 Stores cannot get effective in-
surance coverage against shoplifting,6 so the amount of loss must be ab-
sorbed as a cost of doing business, and consequently it is passed on to
the consumer in the form of higher prices.7
The ranks of the shoplifters contain a variety of types of people, with
the great bulk classified as "amateurs," predominantly women and juve-
niles.8 The juvenile problem seems to be increasing9 and often shoplift-
ing may provide a youth's first venture into crime.'0 Professional shop-
47. CAEDoZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 3 (1928).
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lifters, called "boosters," are less prevalent, but more skilled," and a
large percentage of these "boosters" are drug addicts, who sell their loot
to buy narcotics. 12  Kleptomaniacs, those who steal because of a neurotic
impulse, are rare.13
In attempting to combat the problem of shoplifting, the larger stores
may utilize mechanical detection devices, such as one-way mirrors, and
employ trained store detectives, but in smaller stores, detection must be
left up to the merchant and his employees.'
4
TORT LIABILITY
Under the common law, a person is allowed to use reasonable force
to defend 15 or recapture' 6 his property. However, instead of applying
these rules, the courts have been inclined to view any detention of a
suspected shoplifter by a merchant as an arrest, and if the merchant can-
not justify his actions under the laws of arrest, he is liable in tort. Since
the shoplifter ordinarily steals relatively small articles,17 shoplifting in
the usual case is a misdemeanor, and the rules applicable are those gov-
1. Cleveland Press, Feb. 23, 1959, p. 1, col. 3.
2. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3939 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
4816.1 (Supp. 1958); S.C. CODE § 16-359.1 (Supp. 1958); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-4235 (Supp. 1958).
3. OHio REv. CODE § 2907.20. For examples of statutes constituting shoplifting
as a separate offense, see supra note 2.
4. De Santis, Anybody Might Be a Shoplifter, Reader's Digest, Feb. 1955, p. 140.
The greatest losses from shoplifting are suffered by department stores and drug
stores, which lose about 1% of total sales, and variety stores, which tend to rate their
loss even higher. Cracking Down on Shoplifters, Business Week, Nov. 1, 1952, p.
58.
5. Ohio retail sales account for 5.67% of the annual national retail sales. U.S.
CENsUS OF BusINEsS: 1954, Vol. I, p. 9 (1957). Therefore, .0567 (Ohio per-
centage) x $250,000,000 (estimated annual shoplifting loss) = $14,175,000.
6. This is because of the practical difficulty of showing that an inventory shortage
was caused by any particular theft, or at what time it occurred. See 5 APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3178 (Supp. 1959).
7. Fay, I Am a Supermarket Detective, Collier's, Mar. 29, 1952, p. 16 at 17.
8. Cracking Down on Shoplifters, Business Week, Nov. 1, 1952, p. 58.
9. Id. at 61; De Santis, supra note 4 at 142.
10. Supra note 8.
11. De Santis, supra note 4.
12. Supra note 8.
13. Supra note 7.
14. Houston Finds a Cure For Shoplifting Spate, Business Week, June 6, 1953,
p. 56.
15. PRossER, ToRTS 92-96 (2d ed. 1955).
16. PRossER, TORTS 100-04 (2d ed. 1955).
17. Comment, 62 YALE LJ. 788 (1952).
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erning arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor. At common law, this
was allowed to peace officers only where a breach of the peace had been
committed in the officer's presence,'8 and was prohibited to private citi-
zens entirely.' 9
An Ohio statute allows either a peace officer or a private citizen to
arrest without warrant one whom he has reasonable grounds to believe
has committed a felony.20 Therefore, a merchant is allowed to arrest
when he has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect to be guilty of
grand larceny, that is, to have taken something worth $60.00 or more.
However, since Ohio still follows the common law rules regarding arrest
for misdemeanors, a private individual arresting another on a mere charge
of petty larceny would be liable for false arrest.2 ' Even if he does not at-
tempt the arrest himself, but instead summons a policeman who arrests
without a warrant, the individual is liable. Since the policeman did not
personally see the act committed, the arrest is illegal, and a private person
who causes an officer to arrest another illegally is liable in tort to the
person thus arrested 2
Although there is a technical distinction between false arrest and'false
imprisonment, in that the former arises by reason of an asserted legal
authority, while the latter arises from detention for a purely private end,2a
Ohio generally uses the term "false imprisonment" to cover both situa-
tions.&2 4 False imprisonment is defined as the unlawful restraint of an-
other05 The essence of the tort is the deprival of the plaintiff's liberty
without lawful justification. 26 As we have seen, the fact that the de-
fendant had reasonable grounds to believe the plaintiff to be guilty of a
misdemeanor is no defense,27 and there is some authority to the effect
18. People v. McLean, 68 Mich. 480, 36 N.W. 231 (1888); Hennessy v. Connolly,
13 Hun. 173 (N.Y. 1878).
19. Union Depot & 1RIR v. Smith, 16 Colo., 361, 27 Pac. 329 (1891); Palmer v.
Maine Cent. RL.L, 92 Me. 399, 42 Ad. 800 (1899).
20. OHio REv. CODE § 2935.04.
21. Szymanski v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 79 Ohio App. 407, 74 N.E.2d
205 (1947); Fitscher v. Rollman & Sons, Co., 31 Ohio App. 340, 167 N.E. 469
(1929).
22. Hill v. Henry, 90 Ga. App. 93, 82 S.E.2d 35 (1954); McDermott v. W.T.
Grant Co., 313 Mass. 736, 49 N.E.2d 115 (1943); Howard v. Burton, 338 Mich.
178, 61 N.W.2d 77 (1953).
23. McGlone v. Landreth, 200 Okla. 425, 195 P.2d 268 (1948); Hepworth v.
Covey Brothers Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P.2d 507 (1939).
24. Thus the one year Statute of Limitations for actions of false imprisonment ap-
plies to actions for false arrest. Alter v. Paul, 101 Ohio App. 139, 135 N.E.2d 73
(1955).
25. Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 451 (1918).
26. Diehl v. Friester, 37 Ohio St. 473 (1882).
27. Supra note 21.
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that even actual guilt of the plaintiff is not a defense, where a private
individual arrests for a misdemeanor.28
The ordinary rules of agency govern detention of a suspected shop-
lifter by a store employee, and since the employee is generally found to
be acting within the scope of his employment, the employer is liable for
such acts.29 Nor can the merchant relieve himself of this liability by
delegating the authority to apprehend shoplifters to an independent de-
tective agency.30
JUDICIAL REMEDIES
The laws of arrest and false imprisonment have provided a strong
deterrent to the merchant in apprehending suspected shoplifters. Recog-
nizing the problem, some courts have sought to mitigate the harshness
of the rules and to allow the merchant leeway to make a reasonable mis-
take without being subjected to tort liability.
Since the term "arrest" implies some asserted legal authority,3 ' it is
clear that not every bare detention need be classified as an arrest. If a
court is willing to recognize the distinction between an arrest and a
mere detention, it may then proceed to find justification for the deten-
tion where there would be no justification for an arrest. The more mod-
ern trend is to recognize this distinction and to find the necessary justifi-
cation.
Thus, if a merchant detains a suspected shoplifter without assuming
to exercise any powers of arrest, the question is one of false imprison-
ment only, with no arrest problem involved. In order to hold the mer-
chant liable for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must have been unlaw-
fully restrained.' 2  Therefore, the merchant can avoid liability by show-
ing either: (1) that the restraint was not unlawful, or (2) that the
plaintiff was not in fact restrained. Two lines of cases have developed,
each acting upon one of these two elements.
1. Lawfulness of the -restraint
One judicial solution is to render the detention lawful by allowing
probable cause as a defense. Thus a merchant could be allowed to detain
for a reasonable investigation a person whom he has probable cause to
28. Fitscher v. Rollman & Sons Co., 31 Ohio App. 340, 167 N.E. 469 (1929).
29. Combs v. Kobacker Stores, Inc., 114 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953); cf.
Cleveland Ry. v. Durschuk, 31 Ohio App. 248, 166 N.E. 909 (1928).
30. Zentko v. McKelvey Co., 88 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Szymanski v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 79 Ohio App. 407, 74 N.E.2d 205 (1947).
31. Supra note 23.
32. Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 451 (1918).
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believe is unlawfully depriving him of his property. Jacques v. Childs
Dining Hall Co.33 was the first case to recognize this right. In that case,
the plaintiff had been called to the cashier's desk as she was leaving the
defendant's restaurant because her aunt, who was with her, but had not
eaten, did not have a check. After some investigation, during which a
question was raised whether the plaintiff herself had paid her check, she
was permitted to leave. In a suit for false imprisonment, the court, with-
out discussing any issue of arrest, held that it was a jury question whether
defendant's conduct was reasonable, saying that the defendant could detain
the plaintiff for a reasonable time to investigate the circumstances, if ap-
parently she had not paid.
This doctrine was extended to the mercantile field in the case of
Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co.,34 in which the plaintiff had been accosted
by store detectives as he was leaving the store and detained for investiga-
tion for twenty minutes before being turned over to the police. During
the interval, he was questioned and was asked to sign a statement, which
he refused to do. Plaintiff sued for false imprisonment, and the court,
saying that no question of arrest was involved, held that probable cause
justified the detention of the suspect for a reasonable length of time to
investigate in a reasonable manner.
It should be noted that this doctrine allows detention of the suspect
for the purpose of investigation only. It does not grant the merchant
any powers of arrest, nor does it authorize the forcing of confessions or
the compelling of payment. If the defendant, after a reasonable investi-
gation, decides that the plaintiff is guilty, he must then seek legal reme-
dies.
The doctrine of the Collyer case has been adopted by courts of an in-
creasing number of states in recent years.35 Some states which have re-
fused to follow it allow probable cause to negate any liability for puni-
tive damages,36 which may leave the plaintiff with merely nominal dam-
ages.
2. Restraint in fact
The second method that the courts have used to shield the merchant
has been to refuse to find a restraint upon the facts of the particular case.
33. 244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843 (1923).
34. 5 CaL2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
35. E.g., Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S.W.2d
361 (1945); Teel v. May Department Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74
(1941); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Bradshaw, 186 Okla. 588, 99 P.2d 508 (1940).
36. E.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 132 FHa. 471, 180 So. 757 (1938); Jefferson
Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947).
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Thus, the merchant may be allowed to request, command, or even threaten
the suspect in order to induce him to remain for investigation, without
being liable for false imprisonment.37
An Ohio court of appeals adopted this approach in Lester v. Albers
Super Markets, Inc.3s In that case, a woman, waiting for a streetcar in
front of the defendant's store, noticed a canned fruit display in the win-
dow and decided to buy a can. While waiting in line to pay for her
purchase, she saw her streetcar coming, so she laid the can aside and
turned to leave. The manager stopped her at the door and demanded
to search her shopping bag, which was a standard procedure of the store.
Being a regular customer, she knew of this practice, but since she was
in a hurry, she told him she hadn't bought anything. The manager stood
in front of her and repeated his demand several times, before she allowed
him to search her bag, after which she was permitted to leave. She sued
for false imprisonment, and the court, after saying that the laws of arrest
were irrelevant, held that there was no restraint in fact sufficient to con-
stitute imprisonment.
As to fortify its decision, the court then went on to state that, "a
customer who apparently has not paid for what he has received may be
detained for a reasonable time to investigate the circumstances . . . ,,,9
thus apparently granting the privilege of the Collyer case. However, since
it had already found that the plaintiff had not in fact been detained, this
appears to be purely dictum.
The factual approach typified by the Lester case is less satisfactory
than the privilege granted by the Collyer case and the line of decisions
which follow it, because through the factual approach each case is decided
upon its own circumstances and there is no certainty as to what may be
labelled as a "restraint."
It seems dear that the granting of any type of privilege to a merchant
to detain suspected shoplifters involves a balancing of two fundamental
concepts: the protection of property and the right to individual liberty.
In broadening the power of the merchant to protect his chattels, a court
or legislature must keep in mind that the innocent shopper should not be
subjected to unnecessary restraint and harassment.
STATUTORY RiEMEDIES
In 1955, Florida passed a statute allowing detention of a suspected
shoplifter by a merchant upon "probable cause," and in addition, allow-
37. Sweeny v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 247 Mass. 277, 142 N.E. 50 (1924); S.H.
Kress & Co. v. DeMont, 224 S.W. 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); James v. MacDougall
& Southwick Co., 134 Wash. 314, 235 Pac. 812 (1925).
38. 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952).
39. Id. at 319, 114 N.E.2d at 533.
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ing a peace officer to arrest such suspect without a warrant.40 The ap-
parent success of this statute in combatting the shoplifting problem41
has led a number of states in the past few years to give merchants by
statute varying degrees of power to detain suspects.
The Ohio General Assembly passed a. shoplifting statute43 in 1957,
the effect of which is twofold:
First, it grants to the merchant and his employees a privilege to detain
a suspected shoplifter in a reasonable manner for a reasonable time upon
probable cause.
Second, it changes the law of arrest to allow a police officer to arrest
the suspect without a warrant, upon probable cause.
Except where the suspect is a minor, the merchant may make the
detention only for the purpose of causing an arrest to be made by a
police officer. Another important limitation upon the merchant's privi-
lege should be noted, that the detention is not lawful unless the suspect
has left the store or has passed the check-out counter in a self-service
store. The Ohio statute is the only one which limits the merchanes
privilege in this manner. The purpose of the provision obviously is to
make easier the proof of intent to steal, one of the necessary elements
of the crime of larceny,44 since the suspect cannot so easily excuse his
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 811.022 (Supp. 1958).
41. Business Week, Dec. 24, 1955, p. 42.
42. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-673-75 (Supp. 1958); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§5 41- 3939-42 (Supp. 1957); GA. CoDE ANN. § 26- 2640-42 (Supp. 1958);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §5 252.1-.3 (Supp. 1958); 1958 Acts of Ky., ch. 11; MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 94B (Supp. 1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 622.26-.27
(Supp. 1958); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402.01-.03 (Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1314-42 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4816.1 (Supp. 1958);
TENN. CODE ANN. 5§ 40-824-26 (Supp. 1958); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-
13 - 30-32 (Supp. 1958); VA. CODE 5§ 18 - 187.1-.3 (Supp. 1958).
43. OHIO REV. CODE § 2935.041, which reads as follows:
"A merchant, or a merchant's employee who has probable cause for believing
that items offered for sale by mercantile establishment have been unlawfully taken
by a person, may, in order to cause an arrest to be made by a police officer until a
warrant can be obtained, detain such person in a reasonable manner for a reasonable
length of time within the said mercantile establishment or the immediate vicinity
thereof. In the event such person detained is a minor, said detention may be made
in order to recover such items without undue restraint or to cause such an arrest or
for the purpose of communicating with the parents or guardian of said minor.
Such detention, however, shall not be lawful unless the person to be detained
has left the confines of the establishment but is within the immediate vicinity thereof;
or, where the establishment is of the self service type, the person to be detained has
passed the cashier's counter.
Any police officer may, within a reasonable time after such alleged unlawful
taking has been committed, arrest without a warrant, any person he has probable
cause for believing has committed such unlawful taking in a mercantile establish-
ment."
44. Berry v. State, 31 Ohio St. 219 (1872).
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conduct by saying that he desired to examine the article under a better
light, or by giving similar excuses. However, the provision weakens
the power of store detectives, who prefer to follow a shoplifter around
the store until his intent to steal is clearly established, and then appre-
hend immediately.4 5 Professional shoplifters are generally quick to sense
that they are being watched,46 and if they know that they cannot be ap-
prehended until they leave the store they can quickly get rid of the
merchandise before leaving. A better solution than that adopted by the
Ohio statute would be the one found in those statutes which make con.
cealment of unpurchased goods prima facie evidence of intent to steal.47
This simplifies proof without weakening the store detective's effective-
ness. Customer goodwill could still provide a check upon abuse of the
privilege.
There is still room for judicial discretion in cases in which the provi-
sions of the statute have not been strictly followed. For example, sup-
pose an alleged detention had occurred before the suspect left the store.
This would be unlawful under the statute, but a court could still decide,
as in the Lester case, that there was no restraint, and that the merchant
is therefore not liable. Thus the statute does not completely supplant
the judicial remedies to the problem of the tort liability of the merchant.
In granting a police officer the right to arrest a suspected shoplifter
upon probable cause, the statute protects both the officer and the mer-
chant who summons him. Ordinarily, an officer who is not personally
present when a misdemeanor is committed may not arrest the person
charged without first obtaining a warrant.48 If he arrests without a war-
rant in such a situation he acts at his peril. Under the statute, the mer-
chant may now summon a police officer who can make a lawful arrest
on the basis of the merchant's communication. The "at peril" aspect is
removed, and even if the suspect is later found innocent, neither the
merchant nor the officer is liable for false imprisonment.
There does not seem to be any problem of the constitutionality of the
statute, although a statute allowing arbitrary arrest without a warrant
would be unconstitutional 49 A statute enlarging the common law pow-
45. See Comment, 46 ILL. L RE. 887, 888 (1952); Note, 32 IND. L.J. 20, 22
(1956).
46. Note, 32 IND. L.J. 20, 22 (1956).
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3942 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4816.1
(Supp. 1958).
48. State v. Lewis, 50 Ohio St. 179, 33 N.E. 405 (1893).
49. Ex parte Rhodes, 202 Ala. 68, 79 So. 462 (1918); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78
Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889).
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ers of arrest is constitutional if the power granted is reasonable, 0 and
here the reasonableness is provided by the fact that the officer may arrest
only upon probable cause.
RELATED TORTS UNDER THE OHIo STATUTE
Because the Ohio statute has not as yet received any judicial interpre-
tation, many possible problems in its application remain unsolved. For
example, there is nothing in the statute dealing with its effect upon liabil-
ity for torts other than false imprisonment, such as slander, assault and
battery, and malicious prosecution.
1. Slander
Slander is often used as an additional count to false imprisonment in
an action against a merchant.51 To charge a person with larceny is ac-
tionable per se, i.e., without proof of special damages.52 A necessary ele-
ment of a slander action is "publication," communication to a third per-
son, 13 so if the accusatory statement is made to the suspect alone and is
not heard by anyone else, there would be no slander. However, if the
suspect is obstinate and a loud argument ensues in front of others, or if
the merchant shouts a warning, such as "Stop, thief!" there is the neces-
sary publication.
An employer is liable for slander by employees acting in the scope
of their employment.5 4 Although truth of the statement is a complete
defense in a slander suit,55 a mistaken belief in the truth is not, but it
may be shown to mitigate damages.5 6 So if the suspected shoplifter is
later found innocent, an action for slander might be successfully prose-
cuted against the merchant.
2. Assault and Battery
Since the least touching of another, if done in a rude, insolent or
angry manner, constitutes a battery,57 the merchant may be committing a
50. Childers v. State, 156 Ala. 96, 47 So. 70 (1908); Burroughs v. Eastman, 101
Mich. 419, 59 N.W. 817 (1894).
51. E.g., Penn v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 209 S.W. 885 (Mo. 1919); Lester
v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952).
52. Hughey v. Bradrick, 39 Ohio App. 486, 177 N.E. 911 (1931).
53. Massee v. Williams, 207 Fed. 222 (6th Cir. 1913); Stivers v. Allen, 115 Wash.
136, 196 Pac. 663 (1921).
54. Citizens Gas & Electric Co. v. Black, 95 Ohio St. 42, 115 N.E. 495 (1916).
55. OHio REV. CODE § 2739.02.
56. Reynolds v. Tucker, 6 Ohio St. 516 (1856); Wilson v. Apple, 3 Ohio 270
(1827).
57. Wilson v. Orr, 210 Ala. 93, 97 So. 133 (1923); Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139
Va. 471, 124 SE. 242 (1924).
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battery if he grabs the suspect by the arm or lays a hand on his shoulder.
Although reasonable force may be used to recapture property wrongfully
taken,58 apparently no force is justified if the owner is mistaken in his
belief in the guilt or identity of the accused.5 9 Because the statute does
not indicate what degree of force may be used in detaining a suspected
shoplifter, liability for assault and battery is still possible.
3. Malicious Prosecution
Malicious prosecution is another action sometimes brought by the
indignant customer who has been wrongfully accused.60 However, since
want of probable cause is an essential element of this tort,61 it is difficult
to conceive of a situation in which a merchant could be held liable for
malicious prosecution if he complied with the provisions of the statute.
4. Possible Broad Interpretation
In dealing with the problem of related torts, perhaps a court, in view
of the legislative intent to facilitate the apprehension of shoplifters, would
construe the statute to relieve the merchant of all tort liability if he acts
reasonably. But possible litigation over this could be avoided if the statute
stated, as does the Virginia statute, that a merchant or his employee who
complies with its provisions "shall not be held civilly liable for unlaw-
ful detention, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false
arrest, or assault and battery .... ,62
THE STANDARDS OF THE OHIO STATUTE
1. Reasonable Time and Manner
The statute sets up reasonableness as the basic test and the standard
for executing the privilege. But what is a "reasonable time" and a "rea-
sonable manner"? These are questions for the jury,63 to be determined
according to the circumstances of the particular case. Fifteen minutes64
58. PROSSER, TORTs 100-04 (2d ed. 1955).
59. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 100, comment d (1934).
60. S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 132 Fla. 471, 180 So. 757 (1938); Jefferson Dry
Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947).
61. Melanowski v. Judy, 102 Ohio St. 153, 131 N.E. 360 (1921); Ash v. Marlow,
20 Ohio 119 (1851).
62. VA. CODE § 18-187.2 (Supp. 1958).
63. Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal.2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936); cf. Johnson v.
Reddy, 163 Ohio St. 347, 126 N.E.2d 911 (1955).
64. Bertolo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936).
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and twenty minutes0 5 have been held to constitute reasonable times for
detention.
The statute is unclear as to how much investigation, if any, the mer-
chant may undertake and still have his conduct classified as reasonable.
It says only that the detention is allowed "to cause an arrest to be made
by a police officer ... ," and that it is allowed for the purpose of recover-
ing the items only when the shoplifter is a minor.66
Often it is difficult to determine whether a person is or is not a
minor. Suppose a youthful looking shoplifter is apprehended and the
merchant, reasonably believing that he is a minor, attempts the recovery
of the goods, only to discover later that the suspect is over twenty-one.
Apparently the statute would not protect the merchant in a situation such
as this.
This is another area in which possible litigation could be avoided by
better drafting. An example of a more precise defining of the allowable
conduct is found in the Pennsylvania statute, which states that the deten-
tion of the suspect is lawful "for the sole purpose of delivering him to a
peace officer without unnecessary delay. . . .The person detained shall
be informed promptly of the purpose of the detention and shall not be
subjected to unnecessary or unreasonable force, nor to interrogation
against his wiU."67
2. Probable Cause
Unlike reasonableness, probable cause is a question of law for the
court.68 It has been defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion sup-
ported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty."' 9 Good faith alone
is not sufficient, if the belief is unfounded, 0 but the accusatory state-
ments of a credible person provide probable cause.71 The burden of
pleading and proving probable cause is on the defendant.7 2
Although probable cause is a question of law, whether the required
facts and circumstances exist in a particular case is a question of fact. So
65. Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal.2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
66. Oz-o REv. CODE S 2935.041.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4816.1 (Supp. 1958).
68. Bock v. City of Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257, 183 N.E. 119 (1931).
69. Id. at 262, 183 N.E. at 121.
70. Canton Provision Co. v. St. John, 52 Ohio App. 507, 3 N.E.2d 978 (1936);
Neff v. Palmer, 152 N.E.2d 719 (Ohio C.P. 1956), aff'd 151 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio
App. 1956).
71. ALEXANDER, LAw oF AERsT 443 (1949).
72. Johnson v. Reddy, 163 Ohio St. 347, 126 N.E.2d 911 (1955); Nappi v. Wil-
son, 22 Ohio App. 520, 155 N.E. 151 (1926).
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where the facts are in controversy, the court must instruct the jury as to
what facts will constitute probable cause and submit to them only the
question of what facts have been established.73 But there is the danger
that in doing this the jury will, in fact, pass upon the question of prob-
able cause. This could be avoided by the use of a special verdict, to
separate questions of law and fact.
3. Mercantile Establishment
Another area in which interpretation is necessary is the scope of the
statute. A "mercantile establishment" is one where the buying and sell-
ing of articles of merchandise, either at wholesale or retail, is conducted.
Since a restaurant is not a mercantile establishment,74 a dispute over pay-
ment of a restaurant check, such as in Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall
Co., 7 5 would not be covered by the statute. Even where a restaurant is
operated in connection with a department store, or other mercantile es-
tablishment, it is not classified itself as a mercantile establishment.7 6 In
certain situations this could lead to anomalous results. For example, a
drug store employee may detain a customer who has apparently pilfered
an article of toiletry, but may not detain one who apparently has left the
lunch counter without paying for his meal.
4. Merchant's Employee
In extending the privilege of detention to the "merchant" and "mer-
chant's employee," the statute does not indicate whether the privilege
likewise extends to store detectives who are independent contractors.
Since such individuals are held to be "employees" for the purpose of hold-
ing the store liable for their acts, 77 a fair implication would be that the
statute also confers the privilege upon them.
CONCLUSION
The Ohio statute is no panacea for the problems confronting the
merchant in the battle against shoplifting. Its faults render it a some-
what less than perfect solution and may provide pitfalls to snare the
73. Bock v. City of Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257, 183 N.E. 119 (1931); Britton
v. Granger, 13 Ohio C.C.R. 281 (1897).
74. D.C. Goff Co. v. First State Bank, 175 Ark. 158, 298 S.W. 884 (1927):
Block v. New Era Cafe, Inc., 23 Ohio L. Abs. 131, 1 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter)
93 (C.P. 1932); 1948 O's. AiT'Y GEN. (Omo) 297.
75. 244 Mass. 438, 138 NE. 843 (1923).
76. 1948 Ops. AxrrY GEN. (OHIo) 297.
77. Zentko v. McKelvey o., 88 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Szymanski v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 79 Ohio App. 407, 74 N.E.2d 205 (1947).
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